Tuesday, 18 March 2008

Alexander Apostolides


How Similar to South-Eastern Europe were the Islands of Cyprus and Malta? Evidence of their Structure during the Interwar Period”

FIRST Draft And Incomplete

Alexander Apostolides

PhD Student, London School of Economics

a.apostolides@lse.ac.uk

www.econcyma.blogspot.com

Abstract:

The islands of Cyprus and Malta have always been considered in economic history as similar to other South-Eastern European states, despite the lack of substantial evidence to prove it. This paper uses new evidence of the gross domestic product of the islands during the interwar period to evaluate that the economic structure of the islands was quite different from each other, as well as from other South-Eastern European states. The paper is part of an ongoing process of estimating the GDP of Cyprus and Malta for the interwar period.

The output of the primary sector (1921 – 1938) indicated that the islands were not keeping up to other Southern-European States in terms of agricultural production. The islands’ agricultural sectors had different growth trajectories: the 1920s was a period of stable growth for Malta, and the depression was prolonged yet not too severe. In Cyprus recovery in the 1920s after the 1921 recession was uneven and the depression was especially severe; agricultural output per capita in 1931 was lower than in 1921. Recovery of the primary sector in Cyprus came from the rapid expansion of copper mining and not from the growth of intensive agriculture.

In terms of economic structure, the islands differ somewhat from the stylised Southern European typology. Malta’s economy is exceptional due to the high urbanisation of the island; Malta’s economic fortunes in the period were explicitly linked to the British navy’s presence there. In Cyprus a move to higher value agriculture was hampered by the lack of capital and fragmented land holdings. Comparing the islands to the South-Eastern European typology indicates that in the late 1930s the performance of the islands diversified from the Southern European perspective, due to factors relating to the islands’ geography (Malta) and mineral resources (Cyprus).

How Similar to South-Eastern Europe were the Islands of Cyprus and Malta? Evidence of their Structure during the Interwar Period”

Introduction

The economic history of Cyprus and Malta has lagged behind the rest of Europe, despite the resurgence of economic history within the geographical periphery of Europe, especially in the field of historical national accounts creation1. This paper arises from an ongoing attempt to estimate the GDP of Cyprus and Malta for the interwar period, by presenting the value added estimates of the primary sector of the islands. The performance of Malta and Cyprus needs to be placed within a context that allows an economic historian to compare and contrast the islands’ experience to the wider world. Thus the results are compared to the interwar experience of South- Eastern European states (SEES).

The historiography of South-Eastern Europe as expressed by Ivanov and Tooze, currently “offers no consistent narrative about economic development… prior to 1945”2. The area was traditionally viewed as one of particularly poor economic growth during the interwar period. The economic conditions were not considered conducive to accelerated economic growth as SEES were suffering a backlog of problems that retarded their economic progress, despite their efforts to modernise3.

The revival in historical national accounts in South-Eastern Europe has led to a more positive approach to the region’s economic outlook during the period. Temin and Toniolo argued that despite the problems of the interwar period “modern economic growth was well under way” in most of Europe4. Ivanov, Pamuk and Kostelenos et al argue that SEES did experience extensive growth which was checked by rapid population growth: for Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey the 1930s as a whole was a positive period in terms of GNP / GDP per capita. Thus the income gap between the wealthier Western Europe and SEES did grow, but not by much. The SEES managed to provide a faster rate of growth to match their rapid population expansion5.

The author is estimating GDP per capita for 1921 – 1938; the limited time period is a conscious decision taken to dispel the conviction that not enough data exists for such project to be feasible. The estimate is based on the production approach following ESA 1995 practices. A rigid adherence to ESA rules is not however always feasible or desirable6. There was no dedicated statistical office in either colony at the time. The islands were British colonies, and were thus obliged to collect a substantial amount of information in order to complete the annual statistical blue books and the annual reports of the relevant departments / offices of the administration. Where information was sparse, archival research in department / office files uncovered a great wealth of information. The amount of research undertaken was not exhaustive: a greater array of sources can be available if further archival research is undertaken. The reliability of the dataset is unknown; there are reasons to suggest that government statistics for these small islands were generally reliable7.

Agriculture, forestry or fishing production estimates for Cyprus are based on 85 products categorised in 19 (4-digit NACE Rev.2) classes. The large number of crop and animal production series are due to the fact that Cypriot agriculture was very diverse; unless the estimate of gross output is as extensive as possible it would fail to capture the true outlook of this diverse sector8. Malta’s agricultural and fishing sector estimates are constituted by 42 products in 14 classes. Cypriot mining and quarrying consists of 18 products in 5 classes; Malta’s quarrying consists of five products in three classes. Gross output is calculated in 1938 producer prices; work is currently being undertaken to estimate the sector in current prices. Intermediate consumption is calculated for 1938 and assumed to be constant throughout the period9. A more detailed description of the methodology can be found at a previous paper10.

Table 1 indicates the first approximation of the GDP of Cyprus and Malta with SEES. Such comparisons are purely indicative. The arbitrary choice of the beginning and the end of each series can alter the stated results; a peak-to-peak approach based on a common currency adjusted for the purchasing power parity of each state would be more reliable. The results shown for Cyprus and Malta are based on the results for the primary sector aggregated for the whole economy.

It seems that both Cyprus and Malta exhibit similar rates of growth as SEES, but due to different reasons; Cyprus’ growth was based on a mining boom, while Malta’s poor growth record was due to its dependency on the British fleet.

Table 1: Rough Comparison of SEES 1921 -1939: GDP Per Capita Growth Rates

Period

Value Measurement

Growth rate %

Turkey

1923 – 1939

GK $ 1990

5.4

Greece

1921 – 1938

Constant 1914

1.6

Bulgaria

1921 – 1938

Constant 1911

1.7

Cyprus (Guestimate)

1921 – 1938

Constant 1938

1 - 3

Malta (Guestimate)

1921 – 1938

Constant 1938

0.5 – 1.5

Source: Martin Ivanov "Bulgarian National Income 1892 - 1924: 60 Years Later of Quarter of a Century Earlier” (forthcoming) Table AO; Ivanov and Tooze (2007) p.684; Sevket Pamuk, “Intervention during the Great Depression - Another Look at Turkish Experience” Ch.12 in Pamuk and Williamson (2000), page 321; Table 12.1; Κωστελένος, et al, Ακαθάριστο Εγχώριο Προϊόν 1830 – 1939 (2007), CD Disk, Table 8-Ib; Own calculations based on the weight of the primary sector to the economy of Cyprus and Malta.

The ultimate reasons provided by SEES historiography for the expansion of agriculture output are compared to the Maltese and Cypriot realities in order to evaluate the experience of the islands. The islands were under similar opportunities and restraints as other SEES, but the islands’ interplay affected them differently.

Agriculture: Restraints and Opportunities

In SEES historiography agriculture seems to undergo a quiet transformation during the interwar period. The pressure on land resources increased with the growth of population either due to high population growth rates or due to enforced migration. As a result, more intensive forms of agricultural production (especially cash crops) developed over the period. There are several reasons suggested for this transformation and as restraints to faster development:

  • Land reform and the reduction of farm sizes leading to specialization in higher intensity products such as animals or tobacco

  • An increase of the agricultural labour force per hectare resulting an increase of labour intensive agricultural production.

  • A lack of sufficient investment in labour saving technologies due to the increase of labour

  • The restraint on faster transformation due to the heavy burden of rural debt preventing.

  • The restraints and opportunities created by government policies of protectionism and investment.

The agricultural output of Cyprus and Malta is presented below at table 2. The results are quite pessimistic for Cyprus and Malta; throughout the period the islands’ agriculture barely kept up with the relatively rapid growth of population. The sector was at best expanding at the rate of population; it the 1930s the agricultural sector was in decline for both islands.

The two economies followed different growth trajectories: the 1920s was a period of relatively consistent output growth for Malta while Cyprus remains more susceptible to cyclical fluctuations that were possibly weather related. The Great Depression was catastrophic for the farmers of Cyprus; this is not fully captured in the GDP estimates which are in constant 1938 prices. During the period 1930 -1932 Cyprus experienced one of the worst droughts in its history. Thus in midst of global falling demand (and prices) for primary products, the Cypriot farmer was unable to stabilize his income by increasing his production: as a result agricultural output in 1931 was lower than in 1921. Malta also suffered milder declines of output in the early 1930s, and the sector did not seem able to rise steady growth of the 1920s.

Table 2: Value Added Per Capita Growth Rates


Period

Value Measurement

Growth Rate per Capita (%)

Population Growth

Turkey

1923 - 1938

GK $ 1990

3.29

2.04

Bulgaria

1921 - 1938

Constant 1911

2.20

1.29

Cyprus

1921 - 1938

Constant 1938

0.189

1.46

Malta

1921 - 1938

Constant 1938

0.845

1.35

Source: Ivanov and Tooze (2007) p.701; Sevket Pamuk, “Intervention during the Great Depression - Another Look at Turkish experience” Ch.12 in Pamuk and Williamson (2000), page 321; Table 12.1; Own calculations.

Cypriot and Maltese agriculture were close to being stagnant in terms of output growth; the sector also seemed relatively slow to accept a change from staple products to more intensely farmed substitutes.




Unlike Bulgaria and Greece, neither Cyprus nor Malta were able to substantially shift towards a delayed “green revolution” of intensified agriculture11.The product mix within agriculture as shown by figures 3 and 4, remained relatively stable despite both islands having a significantly large and archaic cereal sector. The shift away from cereals and into products more suited to the Mediterranean climate very gradual: there was a decrease of cereal output and an increase in the importance of citrus and grapes in Cyprus and vegetables and animal products in Malta, but the large shift away from cereal production took place only after the Second World War. Cereal production did decline somewhat during the period 1921 -1938; however, the post war success products indicated a steady rather than dynamic growth in their share of total agricultural output. As a result, Malta and Cyprus in 1938 remained largely dependent on the same staple products that they were producing. The “green revolution” was on its way but took route after 1945.



The poor performance of cereal production created significant problems in both islands. The cultivation of cereals on the plains of Cyprus (and Malta) was considered as “the main activity of the farming community”12. It was simply not possible for the Cypriot or Maltese farmer, armed with primitive farming methods and equipment, to compete with the more fertile and productive cereal producers of the new world.


Why did Cyprus and Malta fail to undergo the same “green revolution” transformation as other SEES in the period 1921-1938? The islands’ unique circumstances, combined with the economic problems they shared with other SEES, resulted in delaying the intensification of agriculture.


In the case of Malta, such intensification took place prior to the period 1921 – 1938. Agriculture was not the most important sector in the economy of the island. The island was dependent on food imports since its occupation from the Knights Hosptiallers in the 16th century: as a result, the population of Malta largely depended on attracting military expenditure from the ruling power for its well-being13. Some sub-sectors of the agricultural seem to be very intensive and specialized to the islands needs; beef meat and goat milk production are such examples. A large number of bullocks that were partially fattened were shipped annually to Malta: the bulls were placed in stalls for fattening and slaughter. Shepherds would cater to the market by taking their goats to the city and deliver fresh milk at ones doorstep. Such sectors were already intensive in character, if poor in quality14.


It seems that for Malta a transformation to intensive forms of agriculture took place earlier; the remaining cereal production was taking place on thin soil were possibly other remunerative uses were hard to find15. The additional combination of scattered plots and the small holdings as demanded by the geographical environment also made it difficult to convert the remaining area into more intensive agriculture. In addition wheat and barley cultivation might have been farmed in an intensive scale: if the reliability of the wheat and barley estimates shown below are to be trusted (there is reason to believe that the acreage was underreported) Malta was already more productive in terms of yield of tons per hectare than other SEES states.



In Cyprus the particular set of problems shared with other SEES resulted to a failure in promoting a more intensive form of agriculture. Rural debt, the lack of credit and issues of land ownership were possibly important in retarding more intensive forms of agriculture. As mentioned above, it is not that these problems were not present in other SEES: rather the particular combination of these problems for Cyprus resulted to insurmountable obstacles to intensified agriculture.


Cyprus suffered from such a fragmented land ownership that it did not allow for intensive development to take place in the period 1921 - 1938. The fragmented land ownership was a problem throughout the SEES, but table 3 indicates that it was especially serious in Cyprus. Land was not just fragmented in separate households but also scattered in several plots around a village. This functioned as a deterrent to any efforts to shift production in more intensively farmed products. The small and scattered plots were often too small to provide sustenance to the rural household; converting a portion of the land to a more and waiting to reap the benefit could have resulted to destitution. The plots were too small and too diversified for some farmers to change products towards a higher value added intensive farming.


Table 3: Agricultural Population and Farm Size in the 1930s

Agricultural Population per Km2 of Arable Land

Percentage of Population by Farm Size in the 1930s


1 - 5 ha

5- 10 ha

10 - 50 ha

over 50 ha

Bulgaria

95.4

29.1

37.3

32

1.6

Czechoslovakia

69.4

20

19.5

39.4

21.1

Greece

86.7

16.9

11.7

21.6

49.8

Hungary

63.1

14.6

12

22.1

51.3

Italy

53.4

17.5

13.6

26.3

42.6

Poland

86.9

14.8

17

20.9

47.3

Romania

79.7

28.1

20

19.7

32.2

Spain

34

18.8

7.1

15

59.1

Yugoslavia

100.1

28

27.9

35.3

9.7

Cyprus

95.6+

38.4

44.5

16.9

N / A*

Malta

1048.5+

N / A

N / A

N / A

N / A

Notes: * Some large estates did exist but were not enumerated separately by Surridge. +For Cyprus and Malta rural rather than agricultural population were used. Source: Ivanov and Tooze, Coveregence or Decline… (2007) p.688; Malta, Report of the Census of 1931, (1932); Malta, Statistical Blue Book (1927), Cyprus: Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1931, (1931); Surridge, A survey of rural life… (1930) pp.55-58, Lanitis, Rural Indebtedness… (revised 1992) p.9

Cyprus also shared the problem of high debt levels of the farming community with other SEES16. The First World War created a demand for Cyprus’ staple products such as grain, carobs and grapes and land was purchased to increase output; the recession of 1921 found many farmers overexposed to informal creditors. Rural debt was considered serious and was one of the major economic issues of the day, promoting several governmental reviews. Surridge estimated rural debt in 1930 as £1769043 or as £5 per capita. After the disastrous combined effects of the Great Depression the drought, Oakden estimated that debt defaults increased, and the total rural debt was estimated as £2000000 or as £5.4 per capita17. By 1940 the debt increased at £2329000 or to £5.7 pounds per capita; the issue was considered detrimental to the war effort and a Debt Settlement Board was set up to renegotiate and liquidate any outstanding rural debt18.


The rural debt was owed mainly to informal sources of finance. This crippled the farmers’ to diversify to other their products as it limited the supply and demand from credit. If farmer repaid their debt the income was squeezed and capital investment put on hold. If the farmers defaulted the supply of informal credit was curtailed thus making it harder for other farmers to borrow money in order to switch to higher value crops. The issue of rural debt especially affected cereal farmers in the central Mesaoria plain. Large parts of the plain could have been converted to citrus production if sufficient investment in irrigation and trees were made. However the cost of conversion were prohibitive for the cereal farmer: an analysis of farming costs in 1938 (in 1938 prices) estimated that the farming costs for one hectare of citrus cultivation for the first four years until a the crop is sold was £737 pounds19. Thus a cereal farmer needed to find the capital to set up citrus production and sustain his household for four years at a time when his income was already falling due to the fall of global cereal prices. Since the farming community was relatively isolated from formal banking, and with government efforts for rural credit already suffering due to the lack of repayment by farmers, it was difficult for the owners of small and scattered plots to borrow for such an amount to undertake the conversion20. The path to higher value intensive agriculture was available; but the lack of access to sufficient capital during the interwar period prevented Cypriot agriculture from rapidly initiating such a transformation. Even though the capital for large scale transformation of the sector for higher value added products was hampered by the lack of sufficient capital, Cypriot smallholders did attempt to increase the productivity of their land by investing in small capital outlays that they could afford, such as in extending the use of artificial fertilizer. Surridge claims that the use of artificial fertilizer in cereal production by small holders was excessive by 192921.


In the case of Cyprus the most important explanation for why Cypriot agriculture did not diversify its production is the lack of access to sufficient capital. The lack of large landowners and the indebtedness of the rural population resulted in capital scarcity: Cypriot farmers, facing decreasing prices and owning small and scattered landholdings, could not muster enough capital so as to shift land from cereals to citrus production by installing water pumps and purchasing trees. Although the government did provide loans through the rural co-operatives and a small agricultural bank the means for farmers to borrow sums of money that were large enough to build an irrigation system, to plan trees and to be sustained until the trees bore fruit were not available en mass until after the Second World War .


Finally, preliminary results in labour productivity indicate that the performance of Cypriot agriculture could be seen with some optimism. The estimated output per worker in the Cypriot agricultural sector indicates that there was a steady increase of productivity of 1.42% per annum. The estimate argues that the agricultural labour was being reduced in relative and absolute terms from 1931 onwards. The result is positive; the sector barely kept with the expansion of the population but did so using less labour. However the result is unreliable since the agricultural labour force statistics for the period 1931 -1938 are extrapolated from the 1946 census; it is possible that the absolute fall in the population engaged in agriculture might be a phenomenon of the year 1939 – 1945 rather than of the period 1931 - 1938. Corrections are currently being devised and an index of capital is currently being constructed to fully evaluate productivity changes.


The relative failure of the Cypriot agricultural sector in the 1930s was contrasted by the dramatic growth of mining, particularly of the copper mining industry. The mining sector employed far less workers than the agricultural sector but grew by leaps and bounds in the mid 1930s. In 1921 the sector was very small, consisting of some asbestos and some cupreous pyrite mines. The development of new copper seams resulted to the rapid explosion of output; by 1938 the mining sector was providing 44% of the primary sector value added of agriculture. It is clear that the mining sector transformed itself from an insignificant part of the economy in 1921 to the main driver of growth in the post-Depression recovery. In terms of size agriculture was still the most important sector in Cyprus; however in terms of growth mining and quarrying were the most important drivers of the Cypriot economy by the mid-1930s.


Conclusion

Using the historiography of SEES states to evaluate the economic history of Cyprus and Malta provides for a greater understanding of the problems and opportunities within their primary sectors in 1921 – 1938. The Maltese islands suggest a very different form of underdevelopment: unlike most of the SEES the majority of the population did not depend on the agricultural sector for their survival. In Malta, agriculture undertook a partial form of intensive cultivation earlier; the sector was not expected to be the main driver of the economy. Cyprus shares most of the problems exhibited by other SEES states. However these problems were combined in a way that led to a different growth path within agriculture by restraining the sector’s transformation to higher value added products.


Finally the real growth in the economy of Cyprus and Malta did not stem form their agricultural sectors: it was the mining sector in the later 1930s that resulted to Cyprus achieving substantial growth rates and the service sector providing for the British Services in Malta. Agriculture in both countries failed to transform itself even in the limited way of the SEES. The reason for the failure was that similar problems to other SEES combined with the islands’ own peculiarities and prevented the islands from further developing a intensive forms of agriculture. More research is needed in terms of capital accumulation and productivity to produce a conclusive result; but it seems likely that the islands’ agricultural sector failed to achieve even the limited success of the South-Eastern European States.


Bibliography:

Aldcroft Derek H, Studies in the Interwar European Economy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997)

Apostolides, Alexander, “Cyprus and Malta: Data Resources on Former British Colonies”, Workshop on Standardised Historical National Accounts for Europe 1870 - 2000, Norwegian School of Economics , Bergen, November 23 - 26, 2006. http://econcyma.blogspot.com/2008/02/note-on-historical-sources-on-economic.html

Apostolides, Alexander, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Lessons Learnt in Estimating the Value Added of the Cypriot Primary Sector and Results” presented at the LSE cliometrics group, 22nd of January, LSE, London. http://personal.lse.ac.uk/colvinc/clio/Apostolides-250108.pdf

Avramov Roumen, & Pamuk Sevket, (eds.) Monetary and Fiscal Policies of South East Europe: Conference Proceedings of the South – East Europe Monetary History Network 13 - 14 April 2006 Sofia (Sofia: Bulgarian National Bank, 2006)

Cyprus, Report on the Activities of the Debt Settlement Board, (Nicosia: GPO, 1945)


Ivanov Martin, "Bulgarian National Income 1892 - 1924: 60 Years Later of Quarter of a Century Earlier” (forthcoming)

Ivanov Martin, & Tooze Adam, “Convergence or Decline on Europe’s Southeastern Periphery? Agriculture, Population and GNP in Bulgaria 1892 – 1945” Journal of Economic History, Vol.67, No.3, (2007), pp.672 – 704.

Jonsson Gudmundur, (ed), Nordic Historical National Accounts: Proceedings of Workshop VI Reykjavik 19-20 September 2003 (Reykjavik: Institute of History, University of Iceland, 2003)

Κωστελένος Γεώργιος, Βασιλείου Δημήτριος, Κουνάρης Εμμανουήλ, Πετμεζάς Σωκρατής, Σφακιανάκης Μιχαήλ, Ακαθάριστο Εγχώριο Προϊόν 1830 – 1939 (KEPE & IAETE: Αθήνα, 2007)

Κωστής, Κώστας, Αγροτική Οικονομία και Γεωρκικαί Τράπεζαι: Όψεις της Ελληνικής Οικονομίας το Μεσοπόλεμο, (Αθήνα, Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τράπεζας)

Kuznets Simon, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966)


Lanitis, Nicolas Constantine, Rural Indebtedness and Agricultural Co-operation in Cyprus, (Limassol: 1944, Revised 1992)


Maddison Angus, World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2003 AD (2006 update) http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/


Maddison Angus, Monitoring the World Economy 1820 – 1995, (Paris: OECD, 1995)


Oakden, Ralph Sir, Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus, (Nicosia, GPO, 1935)


Pamuk, Sevket, "Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820," The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66, 2006, pp. 809-828.


Pamuk Sevket, & Williamson Jeffrey G., The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation (London and New York: Routledge, 2000)

Phylaktis, Kate, “Banking in a British Colony”, Business History, Vol.30, No.4 (1988) pp. 416- 431


Potts, H. W. Lecture on the Improvement of Livestock of Agriculture Delivered at the Palace 06/02/1930 (Malta: GPO, 1930)


Robinson E. A. G. (ed.), “Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations: Proceeding of a Conference Held by the International Economic Association” (London: Macmillan, 1960)


Spulber Nicolas, The State and Economic Development in Eastern Europe (New York: Random House, 1966)

Stockdale, F. A., Report on the Present Condition of Agriculture in the Maltese Islands 1934 (Malta: GPO, 1934)

1Recent work includes: Martin Ivanov, “Long-Run Bulgarian Economic Development 1892 – 1945: GNP Estimates, Methods and Data Sources” in Roumen Avramov and Sevket Pamuk (eds.) Monetary and Fiscal Policies of South East Europe: Conference Proceedings of the South – East Europe Monetary History Network 13 - 14 April 2006 Sofia (Sofia: Bulgarian National Bank, 2006) pp.187 – 196; Gudmundur Jonsson (ed), Nordic Historical National Accounts: Proceedings of Workshop VI Reykjavik 19-20 September 2003 (Reykjavik: Institute of History, University of Iceland, 2003); Γεώργιος Κωστελένος, et al, Ακαθάριστο Εγχώριο Προϊόν 1830 – 1939 (KEPE & IAETE: Αθήνα, 2007), Sevket Pamuk "Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820," The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66, 2006, pp. 809-828.

2Martin Ivanov and Adam Tooze “Convergence or Decline on Europe’s Southeastern Periphery? Agriculture, Population and GNP in Bulgaria 1892 – 1945 Journal of Economic History Vol.67, No.3, (2007) pp.672 – 704, p.772

3Nicolas Spulber, The State and Economic Development in Eastern Europe (New York: Random House, 1966) p.75

4Ivanov and Tooze provide an excellent review of pre-1914 growth: Ivanov & Tooze, (2007) pp.672 - 678

5Martin Ivanov "Bulgarian National Income 1892 - 1924: 60 Years Later of Quarter of a Century Earlier” (forthcoming) Table AO; Ivanov and Tooze (2007) p.884; Sevket Pamuk, “Intervention during the Great Depression - Another Look at Turkish Experience” Ch.12 in Pamuk and Williamson (2000), page 321; Table 12.1; Κωστελένος, et al, Ακαθάριστο Εγχώριο Προϊόν 1830 – 1939 (2007), CD Disk, Table 8-Ib

6 Riitta Hjerppe: “Understanding Economic Development Through Historical National Accounts” pp.81 – 97 in Ola Honningdal Grytten (ed.) Nordic Historical National Accounts Proceedings Workshop IV, Solstrand, November 13-15th 1998 (p.85

7 For a more detailed analysis of sources and reliability see Alexander Apostolides, “Cyprus and Malta: Data Resources on Former British Colonies”, Workshop “Historical National Accounting Across Europe”, November 2006, NHH, Bergen

8D. A. Percival, Cyprus, Census of Population and Agriculture 1946: Report and Tables (Nicosia, GPO, 1947), p.56

9Source: Malta, Annual Report of the Office of Agriculture, 1921 – 1922 to 1937 – 1938; The reports introduce a timing issue as they were completed 6 to 2 months before the end of the calendar year.

10 Apostolides, Alexander, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Lessons Learnt in Estimating the Value Added of the Cypriot Primary Sector and Results” presented at the LSE Cliometrics Group, 22nd of January, LSE, London. http://personal.lse.ac.uk/colvinc/clio/Apostolides-250108.pdf

11 Ivanov, "Bulgarian National Income 1892 - 1924” (forthcoming) p.12; Κωστής, Κώστας, Αγροτική Οικονομία και Γεωρκικαί Τράπεζαι: Όψεις της Ελληνικής Οικονομίας το Μεσοπόλεμο, (Αθήνα, Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τράπεζας), p.32

12 Oakden, Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus (1934) p.11

13 Metwally, M., M., Structure and Performance of the Maltese Economy (1977) p.6

14 Potts, H. W. Lecture on the Improvement of Livestock of Agriculture Delivered at the Palace 06/02/1930. p.4; Stockdale, F. A., Report on the Present Condition of Agriculture in the Maltese Islands 1934 (Malta: GPO, 1934) p.x

15 The department of agriculture was only set up in 1921 and not provided with an experimental farm until much later.

16 Aldcroft, Derek H., Studies in the Interwar Economy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997) p.167

17 Surridge, The Survey of Rural Life… (1930) p.37; Oakden, Ralph Sir, Report on the finances and economic resources of Cyprus, (Nicosia, GPO, 1935)

18 Nicolas Constantine Lanitis, , Rural Indebtedness and Agricultural Co-operation in Cyprus, (Limassol: 1944, Revised 1992) p.17; Cyprus, Report on the activities of the Debt Settlement Board, (Nicosia: GPO, 1945) p.1

19 James H M and Koumides C. “An Analysis of Farming costs in Cyprus (Part 2)”, Cyprus Agricultural Journal, Vol.XXXIV, Part.3 (1939) pp.99 - 100

20 Phylaktis, Kate, “Banking in a British Colony”, Business History, Vol.30, No.4 (1988)pp. 416- 431 p.418

21 Surridge, The Survey of Rural Life… (1930) p.63



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